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$\mathrm{A}\mathrm{l},\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}$ : Considcr an $\mathrm{n}$ -person normal form game iu which each playcr acts ralioually, bul subject 10 a
constrainl mad$e$ by a moral $\mathrm{j}\iota t$dgement rule (MJ for short), which gives players the proper inslructions
$\mathrm{a}\mathrm{h})\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}$ the sel of actions that are allowed 10 take in their silualions (i.e., the combination of a preferences
profile and olhers’ actions). The purpose of lhis paper is to clarify the properties and lhe existence
conditions of equilibrium derived from each player’s ralional choice under the $\mathrm{g}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\iota \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ , callcd morally
consistenl.equilibrium (MCE for short). We show lhat the set of MCEs contains the set of approval
cquilibria, which is a special class of (pure) Nash equilibria, and is contained in the sct of $(\rho\iota \mathrm{l}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e})$ Nash
equilibria if MJ satisfies four axioms, i.e., anonymity, neutralily, monotonicity and effecliveness. each of
which reflects ethical values of morals $\sigma \mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{s}1$ and 2). Moreover lhe set of Nash equilibria is
eqnivalcnl lo the set of MCEs if MJ satisfies $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\iota$ uenlralily and monolonicily $\sigma \mathrm{h}\mathrm{c}o\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}3$ ).
These resulls, in particular Theorem 2, have three implications. First, any morally righl action of a
player is incentive compatiblc in lhe seuse lhat it is lhe $\mathrm{k}s\mathrm{t}$ rcsponse slralegy in all lhe actions available
to the ptayer if others take morally rigt actions. $\mathrm{U}\mathrm{s}\iota \mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y}$most of economists aud game lheorists share au
inluition lhat a devialion from morally $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\iota$ actions make one belter off if olhers acls morally. However
this inluilion is indeed false as shown in Theorem 2. Second, morals is incffective as a norm thal conducl
one to morally $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\iota$ aclions in a socicty. This strongly holds for Kautian ulilitariauism advocated in $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$
lileratures of moral philosophy. Third, lhis paper carries out a normative $\mathrm{j}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ of Nash equilibrium.
Nash equlibrium, allhough has been supporled by prescriplive game lheory, is justified by a normative
aspect.
1 This paper is prescnted in seminars of Hokkaido University, Kyoto Universily, Kobe Uuiversily, and
Kansai Univcrsily iu 1998. Wc lhank lhe patlicipanls for lhcir $\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{l}\iota 1$ commenls. In parlicular dclailcd and
$\mathrm{h}_{}\mathrm{C}_{-}\mathrm{e}$-mails by Naoki Yoshihara and Manabu Toda, received afler the seminars, werc very $\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\iota 1$ for
lhe revision of the earlier manuscripl. Nagahisa is financially $\mathrm{s}\iota \mathrm{i}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ by Spccial Research $\hslash\iota \mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}$ of
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1 Introduction
Morals is a syslem of rules about whal is righl or wrong, and what is good or bad to do in socicty.
Although morals varies from country 10 $\mathrm{c}o$unlry, cullure 10 cullure, era to era, and so forlh, lhere has
been no sociely in lhe past and the present lhat dispenses wilh morals. One of the reasons why any
society rctains morals might be. lhat people think of lhem 10 give $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}o$pcr suggcstioIls for good and
right actions in their course of social lives.
We have no doubt about the necessity of morals, but can we immediately conclude thal the
resulling stale of the world is good or right when everyone takes the right aclion in lhe light of
morals? Apart from morals, we know the phenomenon of sfallacy of composiliont ill ralional choices.
$?l\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ shows that lhe rational aclions of lhe people give rise to the irralional consequence for lhe
whole society. $7\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ similar phenomenon to it may occur in the case of morals. The peoplest morally
right actions might derive the morally wrong or improper outcome for the whole society. Even if the
resulling slate is morally right, it might be unacceptable from the viewpoint of their happiness or
well-being. However il is obvious lhat which state results from morally righl aclions of people
depends on what kind of morals prevails in the sociely. Thus $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}e$ceding to study lhe consequence
of morally righl aclions, we need to clarify lhe meanings of morals for the first lime.
Morals is thought of as a principle of actions governing self-determinatioll, the role of which is to
indicate appropriate instructions about what people should do when they come across the questions
what is good and how they behave in various siluations.2 $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ is a tentative $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{I}}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ of morals we
give here. Wilh lhis definition of morals we cope with the problem of rational choices constrained by
morals in a game lheoretic model. This paper aims at developing the above approach to morals.
Kaosai University in 1997.
2 Here we have to notice lhe following two facts: First, though morals reslrict lhe range of actious which
lhey can select, lhey gencrally have the remaining room for ralional aclions according to lhcir owl]
preferences. Morals do not nccessarily limit $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}1e^{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{s}$ free will completely. Second, oue particular society
has one system of morals which is accepted by all lhe members, so lhal pcople nevcr have different
morals in priucipl$e$ . In thal sense, morals have same property as laws.
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Consider an $\mathrm{n}$-person normal form game in $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}$ each player acls ralionally, but subjecl to a
constraint made by some moral judgement rule (MJ for short). Here MJ is the syslem which gives
players some proper suggeslions about the set of actions lhat are allowed lo take in lheir siluations
(described by lhe combination of the preferences profile and the olherst actions). Formally it is
defined by a nonempty correspondence that associates with each player standing at a siluation the
sel of actions which are morally allowed to take. Il is an formal illuslralion of morals, and has a role
of constrainl on self-delermination.
The purpose of lhis paper, hence, is to clarify the properlies and the existence conditions of
equilibrium derived from each $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}^{\mathrm{I}}s$ rational choioe under the given $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$, called morally consistent
equilibrium (MCE for short). An actions profile (a combination of strategies) is a MCE if and only if
the action taken by each player is permitted under $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ situation according to the $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ , and is
oplimal in the se$\mathrm{t}$ of such actions with $\mathrm{r}e$spect 10 $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ preference. In other words, MCE is a Social
equilibrium (Debreu (1952)) in the set of actions reslricted by $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ . For example, take a 2-person 2-
strategy game, where each player has strategies (actions) X and $\mathrm{Y}$ Player 1ts preference is given in
descending order by: $\mathrm{X}\mathrm{X},$ $\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{X},$ $\mathrm{X}\mathrm{Y},$ $\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{Y}\cdot$, and $2^{1}\mathrm{s}$ by: $\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{X},$ $\mathrm{X}\mathrm{X},$ $\mathrm{X}\mathrm{Y},$ $\mathrm{Y}\mathrm{Y}$. Here, for example, YX
represents the state where player 1 chooses $\mathrm{Y}$ and 2 chooses X. Suppose that MJ permits player 110
take X and $\mathrm{Y}$ (respectively $\mathrm{Y}$ only) if player 2 takes X (respectively Y). On lhe olher hand, suppose
lhat lhe moral judgemenl rule permils player 210 lake X (respectively X and Y) if player 1 takes $\mathrm{Y}$
(respectively X). Then only XX is the unique MCE under this $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ .
Which aclions profile is a MCE depends on which MJ applies. In olher words, we do nol know
what is morally right (or wrong) unlil we verify the contents o.f $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ . We adopt an axiomatic approach
to MJ in lhis paper. We lake four normalive axioms which MJ should satisfy, and examine lhe
properties of MCE under the MJ salisfying them simultaneously.
$\prime \mathrm{n}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ firsl axiom is anonymity, which demonstrates that lhe mulual exchange of posilions of lhe
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players has the same implication as before. That is, if lhe preferences profile changes
correspondingly to lhe permulation of posilions among players, the aclions derived from lhose
allowed before must also be permilled now. In other words, lhere is no-importance-in rellaming lhe
players.
ne second axiom is neulrality. It demonstrales that if lhe new preferences profile.is lhe same as
the old one on lhe sel of aclions profiles $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ permuling the $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{l}\iota \mathrm{s}$ , the $\mathrm{p}e$rmuted aclion under lhe
new profile is always judge.d righl whenever lhe original action under the old profile is allowed to
take. Nole that neulrality is slronger than independence which is interpreted as minimum
informational requirement, that is, any MJ only needs lhe preference orderings on thal set of actions.
The third axiom is monotonicity. Take some action. If each player’s preference changes to enhance
lhe rank of that action, it must also be judged morally right whenever it is accepted before according
to the $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ .
$7\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ fourth axiom is effectiveness which says lhat at least one action must be judged morally right
for any preferences profile given a set of other players’ aclions according to $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ . $\mathrm{T}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ is a necessary,
bul nol sufficient, condition for existence of morally consistenl equilibrium ullder any preferences
profile.
$\mathrm{R}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}$ paper shows that if MJ satisfies lhe above four axioms, lhe set of MCE coincides with lhal of
Nash equilibria under any preferences profile. $\mathrm{T}l\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ result is interpreted in the following two ways.
First, il suggests that morals are not an effective norm as 10 persuade individuals to take socially
desirable actions. Our stand point on moral philosophy may be called a weak version of Kanlian
utilitarianism, a slrong version of which is defended by Hare (1981) in order lo advocale his two
level lheory of moral judgement. Ours is weaker since lhe interpersonal comparisons of utility are
permilted in Hare’s but not in ours.
Second, our analysis is inlerpreted to accomplish a normative axiomalizalion of Nash equilibrium.
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The notion of Nash equilibrium has been sustained from prescriplive point of view, which explaills
lhe justificalion of Nash equilibrium by the rationality aspect-in deciding the actions. On the other
hand, as the result shows, Nash equilibrium-is also juslified from lhe normative and $e\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$ point of
view with respect to moral judgement on actioIls.
Whe organization of the rest of this paper is as follows. We present lhe model in the next section.
The purpose of $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ seclion-is 10 define MJ and the axioms, and to propose lhe stricl nolion of MCE.
Section 3 conlains a lheorem and its proof. $\mathrm{T}l\iota e$ meaning of the lheorem and lhe direclion of
extensions of our analysis are also discussed with respect to game theory and moral philosophy.
Section 4 is the conclusion.
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2 Definilions and Notation
Consider a normal form game $\mathrm{G}rightarrow-(\mathrm{N}, \Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{i}})$ , where $\mathrm{N}$ is lhe finite set of players $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}$ consists
of at leasl two, and $\mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is player $\mathrm{i}^{1}\mathrm{s}$ slralegy set which consisls of finite number of elemenls with al
leasl two. Each elemenl in $\mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is called player $\mathrm{i}^{\iota}\mathrm{s}$ slralegy, and.$\mathrm{i}^{\mathrm{S}}$ denoted by $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}$ . For convenience sake,
il is assumed lhal all lhe players have lhe same strategy sel denoled by $\mathrm{X}=\mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{i}=1,\ldots,\mathrm{n})$. $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is
interpreled as lhe action laken by player $\mathrm{i}$, and also called player $\mathrm{i}’ \mathrm{s}$ action. An aclions profile is n-
luple of actions $\mathrm{x}=(\mathrm{x}_{1},\mathrm{x}_{2},\ldots,\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{n}})$ . As a matter of convenience $\mathrm{x}$ is regarded as a function from $\mathrm{N}$ to X,
and $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is oflen denoled by $\mathrm{x}(\mathrm{i})$. The sel of aclions profiles is indicated by $\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ . TCen $\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}=\Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{i}\cdot}$ ll this
paper each social state is assumed lo consist of $\mathrm{n}$-luple of actions, one for each individual player.
Hence each aclion profile is looked upon as a social stale. In the following, $\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ is called the sel of
social states if necessary.
As usual each player $\mathrm{i}$ is supposed 10 have a complete and transitive pre$f\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}\sim:\succ$ on the set of
social slates $\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}.\succ}=(_{\sim}^{\succ_{1}}\sim’\sim\succ_{2},\ldots, \sim \mathrm{n}\succ)$ is called a preferences profile. Let $\mathrm{P}$ be lhe set of complete and
transitive preferences on $\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ . As a malter of $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{I}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{e}$we $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{d}\succ \mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\sim$ a functioll from $\mathrm{N}$ to $\mathrm{P}$, and
$\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\succ_{\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{y}\sim\sim(\succ \mathrm{i})$ . We assume lhat all logically possible se$\mathrm{t}$ of preferences profiles is $\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$.
Take a player $\mathrm{i}$ arbitrary. Given (n-l)-luple of actions of other players $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.=(\mathrm{x}_{1},\mathrm{x}_{2},..,\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}\sim 1},\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}\star 1},\ldots,\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{n}})$
and a preferences $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}_{1}1\mathrm{e}^{\succ}\sim$’ lhe combination $(\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i},\sim}\succ)$ is interpreted as a situation in which player $\mathrm{i}$ is
put, and called $\mathrm{i}’ \mathrm{s}$ situalion simply. A moral judgement rule, MJ for shorl, is a mapping which
associates with each player $\mathrm{i}$ the set of actions that $\mathrm{i}$ is allowed to take when he is put in lhe situalion
$(\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}’\sim}\succ)$ . Formally, $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}_{\mathrm{i}}.\mathrm{s}$ a nonempty-valued correspondence from $\mathrm{N}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}\cdot 1}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ to X. Given a $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ , for
an $\mathrm{i}’ \mathrm{s}$ situation $(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}},,\succ)\sim’ \mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i},\sim}\succ)$holds, lhen $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is called to be morally consislent for $\mathrm{i}$ in the
silualion $(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{I}}.\cdot, \sim\succ);\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}$ not, morally inconsistent. MJ not only judges aclions from the viewpoint of
morals, but also enforces players not 10 take morally inconsistent actions.
Given a MJR, an aclions profile $\mathrm{x}$ is a $\mathrm{m}o$rally consistent equilibrium under a preferences
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$\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}_{1}1\mathrm{e}\succ \mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\sim$ [ $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},$ $\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}},\succ)\sim$ and $\mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}},$ $\mathrm{x}_{\sim \mathrm{i}})$ for any $\mathrm{y}_{i}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},$ $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.,\succ)\sim$ ] are true for any player $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$.
DeIlote the set of morally consistenl equilibria (MCE for shorl) under a preferences $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}o\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}e\sim\succ$ by
$\mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$ , and lhe sel of (pure) Nash equilibria $\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\succ \mathrm{b}\mathrm{y}\sim \mathrm{N}\mathrm{A}(_{\sim}\succ).$ Rat is, $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{A}(_{\sim}\succ)\mathrm{e}\sim \mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{y}_{1}., \mathrm{x}_{-i})$
for any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ and $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{X}$.
$h1\mathrm{y}$ MCE $\mathrm{x}$ under a preferences $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\sim\succ$ is a social equilibrium (Debreu (1952)) where each
player $\mathrm{i}’ \mathrm{s}$ strategy set is restricted to $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{x}_{\dot{1}}.,\succ)\sim$ . In other woroe whenever player has an incenlive
10 deviale from $\mathrm{x}$, his devialion is self-reslrained by the judgement that the aclion is morally
inconsistent according to $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ .
$\mathrm{T}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{o}$ remarks are in order. First, from lhe above definition, MCE is derived from $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ . MJ indicates
the possible aclions to choose for each player under a given situation, so that lhe final decision
among them depends on each player’s free will. Henoe MJ does not necessarily deprive freedom to
choose of the players. Morals in this sense are not strong command 10 do something, but weak
command not to do something.
Second, there is a problem on expectations of players in a normal form game. Each player selecls
his stralegy simultaneously, so lhal they must make a consistent belief on others\dagger strategy choice in
the normal form game. In the same way, each player must make a consist $e\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ belief on olhers’
slralegy choice in MCE. Olherwise, MCE may not be attained through simultaneous seleclion of
actions by players. We have lwo possible answers to this question. One is 10 presuppose thal all lhe
players have common knowledge about lhe obedience to MJ among the players. This presupposilion
is quite natural since all the members of the sociely have common interest in morals. The other
answer is that MCE is a reference point to judge the resulling $\mathrm{s}$.ocial stale 10 be righl or wrong, and is
not necessarily a guide 10 play a real game. In this case we need no specificalion of playerst beliefs
on others $t$ slrategies.
Now we formulate axioms on $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ . Let $\pi_{\mathrm{i}}$ be a permulation on N. For any preferences $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}_{1}1\mathrm{e}\succ \mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\sim$
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define a new preferences $\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}11\mathrm{e}}\sim\succ\#$ by $\sim^{\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}}\succ$ the following, For any player $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ and any alternalive $\mathrm{x}$,
$\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}\succ\succ n},$$\mathrm{x}_{\sim}(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{y}\mathrm{r}arrow \mathrm{x}\mathrm{o}\pi_{\sim}(\pi(\mathrm{i}))\mathrm{y}\mathrm{o}\pi$ .
Anonymily (AxiomA)
For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\sim\in\succ \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$, and $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ , $\mathrm{x}(\mathrm{i})\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})\sim’rightarrow \mathrm{x}(\pi(\mathrm{i}))\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\pi(\mathrm{i})^{\succ},\sim^{R}’(\mathrm{x}\mathrm{o}\pi)_{\pi(\mathrm{i})}.)$ .
Lel $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}$. be given. For any player $\mathrm{i}$ , let $\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathrm{x}_{\sim \mathrm{i}})=\{\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}:\mathrm{y}=(\mathrm{y}_{i}, \mathrm{x}_{i}.), \mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{X}\}$. Let $\mathrm{p}_{1},\ldots,\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{n}}$ be
permutatiolls on X. For any $\mathrm{x}=(\mathrm{x}_{1},\ldots,\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{n}})\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$, lel us denote pox$=(\mathrm{P}\downarrow \mathrm{o}\mathrm{x}_{1},\ldots, \mathrm{p}_{\mathfrak{n}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{n}})$, and (pox).
$\mathrm{i}^{=()\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}\cdot 1},\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{i}+1}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x}_{\dot{1}*1},\ldots,\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{n}})}\mathrm{P}\iota^{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x}_{1,\ldots,\mathrm{f}:\cdot 1}}$ . Let $\mathrm{Y}$ be a nonempty subset of $\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ . We say thal lwo
preferences $\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}}\sim^{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}}\sim\succ\succ$ ’ are homothetic on $\mathrm{Y}$ with respecl to $\mathrm{p}$ if $\mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ(\mathrm{j})\mathrm{y}<arrow \mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ’(\mathrm{j})\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{y}$ is lrue
for any $(\mathrm{x}, \mathrm{y})\in \mathrm{Y}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$. Let $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$ be given. We say lhat two preferences $\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{r}o\mathrm{f}_{1}1\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}}\sim^{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}}\sim\succ\succ$’ are j-
homothetic on $\mathrm{Y}$ with respecl to $\mathrm{p}$ if $\mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ(\mathrm{j})\mathrm{y}rightarrow \mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ’(\mathrm{j})\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{y}$ for any $(\mathrm{x}, \mathrm{y})\in \mathrm{Y}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$.
Neutrality (Axiom N)
For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\sim\succ,$ $\sim\succ’\in \mathrm{P}^{1}\backslash ,$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ , and $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{x}^{\iota \mathrm{V}},\succ\sim$ $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\succ\sim$ ’ are homothetic on $\{\mathrm{x}\}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})\mathrm{U}\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.)\mathrm{x}\{\mathrm{x}\}$ with
respect to $\mathrm{p},$ $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i} ,\sim\succ, \mathrm{x}_{-i})^{\mathrm{e}arrow}\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ\sim’, (\mathrm{p}o\mathrm{x})_{-\mathrm{i}})$.
We say lhal $\mathrm{p}=(\mathrm{p}_{1},\ldots,\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{n}})$ is an idenlily if $\mathrm{p}_{1},\ldots,\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{n}}$ are identities.
Independence (Axiom I)
For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\sim’\sim’\in\succ\succ \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ , and $\mathrm{X}\in \mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\succ\succ\sim^{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}}\sim$ ’ are $\mathrm{h}o$mothelic on $\{\mathrm{x}\}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.)\mathrm{U}\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathrm{X}_{-\mathrm{i}})\mathrm{x}\{\mathrm{x}\}$ wilh
respect 10 an identity $\mathrm{p}$, then $\mathrm{x}_{\dot{\mathrm{t}}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{X}_{\sim \mathrm{i}})\sim’rightarrow \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ’, \mathrm{X}_{\sim \mathrm{i}})\sim$ .
Obviously Axiom I is weaker than Axiom N.
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Monotonicity (Axiom M)
For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\succ\sim’\sim\succ’\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ . $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ , and $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$, if $\mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ(\mathrm{j})\mathrm{y}arrow \mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ’(\mathrm{j})\mathrm{y}\ \mathrm{x}\succ(\mathrm{j})\mathrm{y}arrow \mathrm{x}\succ’[\mathrm{j}$ ) $\mathrm{y}$ for any $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}-\{\mathrm{x}\}$ ,
lhen $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{X}_{-i})\sim’arrow \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ’, \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim$. for any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$
If MJ satisfies Axiom, then Axiom $\mathrm{M}$ is equivaleilt to the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}11\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{g}$.
Axiom $\mathrm{M}^{*}$
For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}^{\succ\succ}\sim’\sim’\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ , and $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$, if $\mathrm{x}_{\sim}^{\succ}(\mathrm{j})\mathrm{y}arrow \mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ’(\mathrm{j})\mathrm{y}\ \mathrm{x}\succ(\mathrm{j})\mathrm{y}arrow \mathrm{x}\succ’(\mathrm{j})\mathrm{y}$ for any $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathrm{X}_{-\mathrm{i}})-\{\mathrm{x}\}$,
then $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})\sim’arrow \mathrm{x}_{i}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ’, \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim$. for any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$
Form now on, we will use Axiom $\mathrm{M}$ in the form of this stronger version. It is necessary for
axiomatizing the set of Nash equilibria to strengthen Axiom $\mathrm{N}$ in the following.
Strong Neutrality (Axiom $\mathrm{S}\mathrm{N}$ )
For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\sim’\sim\succ\succ’\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ , and $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}\succ},$
$\sim$
and $\sim\succ$ ’ are $\mathrm{i}$-homolhetic on $\{\mathrm{x}\}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathrm{X}_{-\mathrm{i}})\mathrm{U}\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})\mathrm{x}\{\mathrm{x}\}$ with
respecl to $\mathrm{p}$ , lhen $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim’.rightarrow \mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{i}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ\sim’, (\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x})_{-\mathrm{i}})$ .
If MJ satisfies Axiom $\mathrm{S}\mathrm{N}$ , then. any player does not necessarily consider others’ evaluation aboul his
aclion at a given siluation. Axiom SN can be interpreted as a requirement of liberalistic moralsa. If
MJ satisfies Axiom $\mathrm{S}\mathrm{N}$ , Axiom $\mathrm{M}$ can strengthen lo lhe following.
Axiom $\mathrm{M}^{*\star}$
For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}^{\succ\succ}\sim’\sim’\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ , and $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ , if $\mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{y}arrow \mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ’(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{y}\ \mathrm{x}\succ(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{y}arrow \mathrm{x}\succ’(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{y}$ for any $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathrm{X}_{\sim \mathrm{i}})$, then
3 To $0\iota \mathrm{l}\mathrm{r}$ judgemenl, $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{i}11(1863)$ is the firsl person who justified likralislic morals. Hc argued that uo
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$\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim’.arrow \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ’, \mathrm{x}_{1})\sim.\cdot$
$\mathrm{E}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{C}_{\backslash }\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}$ (Axiom E)
For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\succ\sim\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ , lhere is some $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ with $\mathrm{x}\in\Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim’.\cdot$
If $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$ then $\mathrm{x}\in\Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})\sim’$by $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{I}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ of MCE. Hence Axiom $\mathrm{E}$ is weaker than the
existence condition of equilibria: MCE must exi $s\mathrm{t}$ for any preferences profile.
The examples below illustrale lhe independence of four axioms $\mathrm{A},$ $\mathrm{N},$ $\mathrm{M}$, and E.
Example 1 (Independence of Axiom A)
For any $\sim\succ\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$, and $\mathrm{x}- \mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}- 1}$, $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ\sim^{\mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{i}}):=\{\beta\in \mathrm{x}:}’.(\beta,\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})\sim(1)(\alpha,\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.)\}$ if $\exists\alpha\in \mathrm{X}\mathrm{s}.\mathrm{t}$ . $(\alpha,\mathrm{x}_{-}$
$\mathrm{i})_{\sim}^{\succ}(1)\mathrm{y}$ for any $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$, otherwise: $=\mathrm{X}.\mathrm{T}l\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ MJ satisfies all axioms except Axiom A.
Example 2 (Independence of Axiom N)
Take $\alpha\in \mathrm{X}$ arbilrary, and fix it. For any $\sim\succ\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ , and $\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}\cdot 1},$ $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}_{\sim},\succ,\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.):=\{\alpha\}$ if $\mathrm{X}_{-}$
$\mathrm{i}^{=(\alpha,\ldots,\mathrm{a})}$
’
$:=\mathrm{X}$ otherwise. $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ MJ satisfies all lhe axioms except Axiom N.
Example 3 (Independence of Axiom M)
Let lhe set $\mathrm{Q}$ of preferences profiles be such $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\iota_{\sim}\succ\in \mathrm{O}rightarrow\exists \mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$, denoled by $\mathrm{x}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$ , with $\mathrm{x}(_{\sim}^{\succ})\prec(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{y}$
for any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ and $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}-\{\mathrm{x}(_{\sim}^{\succ})\}$. For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\sim\in\succ \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ , and $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}\sim 1},$ $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim’.:=\{\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\succ\sim\in \mathrm{Q}$ and
$(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}},\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.)=\mathrm{x}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$ , $:=\mathrm{X}$ olherwise. This MJ satisfies all the axioms except Axiom M.
one ought to $\mathrm{k}$ interfere with other’s liberties as possible as one can.
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Example 4 (Independence of Axiom E)
For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}_{\sim}\succ\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ , and $\mathrm{x}- \mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}\cdot 1},$ $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}_{\sim},\succ,\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.):=\{\beta\in \mathrm{X}:(\beta,\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})\sim(\mathrm{i})(\alpha,\mathrm{x}_{-i})\}$ if $\exists\alpha\in \mathrm{X}\mathrm{s}.\mathrm{t}$ . $(\alpha,\mathrm{X}_{-\mathrm{i}})\succ(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{y}$
for any $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}-(\mathrm{a},\mathrm{X}_{-i})$ and $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}-\{\mathrm{i}\}$ , otherwise $:=\mathrm{B}(\mathrm{i}_{\sim},\succ,\mathrm{x}_{i}.),$ $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{l}\iota \mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{B}(\mathrm{i}_{\sim},\succ,\mathrm{x}_{i}.)=\{\beta\in \mathrm{X}:(\beta_{\mathrm{X}_{-}}$,
$i)_{\sim}^{\succ}(\mathrm{i})(\alpha,\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})$ for any $\alpha\in \mathrm{X}$}.
This MJ salisfies all tlle axioms excepl Axiom E. Let us sllow lhal lhis MJ violates Axiom E.
Take $\alpha,$ $\beta\in \mathrm{X}$ arbtrary. Take social states such that $\mathrm{x}^{1}=(\mathrm{a},\mathrm{a},\alpha,\ldots,\mathrm{a},\alpha),$ $\mathrm{x}^{2}=(\beta,\alpha,\alpha,\ldots,\alpha,\alpha),\ldots$,
$\mathrm{x}^{\mathfrak{n}}=(\beta,\beta,\beta,\ldots,\beta,\mathrm{a}),$ $\mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{n}*1}=(\beta,\beta,\beta,\ldots,\beta,\beta)$ , $\mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{n}+2}=(\alpha,\beta,\beta,\ldots,\beta,\beta),\ldots$, $\mathrm{x}^{2\mathfrak{n}\sim 1}=(\alpha,\alpha,\alpha,\ldots,\alpha,\beta,\beta)$, and
$\mathrm{x}^{2\mathrm{n}}=(\mathrm{a},\alpha,\alpha,\ldots,\mathrm{a},\mathrm{a},\beta)$ .
kl $\mathrm{Y}(1)$ be the set of social states each of which consisls of $\mathit{0}$ne number of $\alpha$ and n-l number of
$\beta$ . Similarly lel $\mathrm{Y}(2)$ be the sel of social states each of which consists of 2 number of $\alpha$ and n-2
number of $\beta$ . Repeating this procedure, we define $\mathrm{Y}(3),\ldots$ , and $\mathrm{Y}(\mathrm{n}- 1)$ . Next let $\mathrm{Z}\langle 1$ ) be the set of
social states each of which contains just one action except $\alpha$ and $\beta$ . Similarly lel $\mathrm{Z}\langle 2$) be lhe set
of social states each of which contains just two actions except $\mathrm{a}$ and $\beta$ . Repealing this procedure,
we define $\mathrm{Z}(3),\ldots,\mathrm{Z}(\mathrm{n}\cdot 1)$ . Let $\mathrm{W}$ be lhe set of social stales remaining. By definition, each element
in $\mathrm{W}$ does not contain $\mathrm{a}$ and $\beta$ as its component. $\mathrm{I}x\iota_{\sim}\succ$ be a preference profile such thal:
$\sim\succ(1):\mathrm{x}^{1},\mathrm{x}^{2},\ldots,\mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{n}*1},\mathrm{x}^{\mathfrak{n}*2},\ldots,$ $\mathrm{x}^{2\mathfrak{n}- 1},\mathrm{x}^{2\mathrm{n}},$
$[\mathrm{Y}(1)],[\mathrm{Y}(2)],\ldots,[\mathrm{Y}(\mathrm{n}- 1)],[\mathrm{Z}\langle 1)],[\mathrm{Z}\langle 2)],\ldots,[\mathrm{Z}(\mathrm{n}- 1)],(\mathrm{W})$
$\sim\succ(2):\mathrm{x}^{2},\mathrm{x}^{3},\ldots,\mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{n}+2},\mathrm{x}^{\mathfrak{n}+3},\ldots,$ $\mathrm{x}^{2\mathrm{n}},\mathrm{x}^{1}$ , ...Dhe rest are the same as $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\succ(\sim 1)\ldots$
$\sim\succ(\mathrm{n}- 1):\mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{n}- 1},\mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{n}},\ldots,\mathrm{x}^{2\mathrm{n}- 1},\mathrm{x}^{2\mathrm{n}},\mathrm{x}^{1},\ldots,$ $\mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{n}- 3},\mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{n}- 2},$ $\ldots{\rm Re}$ rest are the same as $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}_{\sim}\succ(1)\ldots$
$\sim\succ(\mathrm{n})$ : $\mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{n}},\mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{n}+1},\ldots,\mathrm{x}^{2\mathrm{n}},\mathrm{x}^{1},\mathrm{x}^{2},\ldots,$ $\mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{n}\cdot 2},\mathrm{x}^{\mathrm{n}\cdot 1}$ , ...Ohe rest are the same as $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}_{\sim}^{\succ}(1)\ldots$
where any social states in the bracket $[]$ are indifferent, and we do not need to specify the ranking of
social slales in lhe bracket $()$ . For example $[\mathrm{Y}(1)]$ means thal all social states in $\mathrm{Y}(1)$ are indifferenl
to each other.
By definition of $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J},$ $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}_{\sim},\succ_{\mathrm{X}_{i}):=\mathrm{B}(,\succ},.\mathrm{i}_{\sim^{\mathrm{X}_{-\mathrm{i}})}}$, for any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ and $\mathrm{x}_{i}.\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}- 1}$ . Thus if MJ satisfies
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Axiom $\mathrm{E}$ lhen there must exisl Nash equilibrium under the profile. By $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{I}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}^{\succ}\sim$’ the Nash
equlibria belongs to W. If X consists of lhree actions then $\mathrm{W}$ is singleton. This is a conlradiclion.
Thus X contains al leasl four actions. Take $\mathrm{x},$ $\kappa \mathrm{X}-\{\alpha,\beta\}$ . The same procedure as in lhe above
$\mathrm{s}_{\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}}\sim}\succ$ furthermore, and we can show lhat the Nash $\mathrm{e}$quilibria consisl only of aclions except $\mathrm{a}$ ,
$\beta,\chi$, and 6. By $\mathrm{r}e$pealing lhis procedures, we can finally $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{y}\succ \mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}\sim$has no Nash equilibrium.
$7\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ is lhe example illustrales the independence ofAxiom E.
The examples below show the existence of MJ wilh the four axioms.
Example 5 For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}^{\succ}\sim\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ , and $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}\cdot 1}$, $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ\sim^{\mathrm{X}_{-i}):=\mathrm{x}}$’
Example 6 For any $\sim\succ\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N},$ $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}\sim}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}- 1}$, $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}_{\sim},\succ_{\mathrm{X}_{i}):=\{\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{x}:},.(\mathrm{y},\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.)\in \mathrm{P}\mathrm{O}(_{\sim}^{\succ},\mathrm{x}.\cdot J$ }, where
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{O}(_{\sim}\succ,\mathrm{x}_{-}1)$ is the set of strong Pareto optimal social states on $\mathrm{X}(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.)\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}^{\succ}\sim$.
3 Main results and $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{n}$) $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}s$
An action profile $\mathrm{x}$ is an approval equilibrium $\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\succ \mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{x}\succ(\sim\sim \mathrm{j})(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{x}_{\sim i})$ for any $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{X}$, and $\mathrm{i},$ $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$ . Let
$\mathrm{A}\mathrm{P}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$ be the set of approval equlibria $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}^{\succ}\sim$ . Obviously $\mathrm{A}\mathrm{P}(_{\sim}\succ)=\bigcap_{\pi\in\Pi}\mathrm{N}\mathrm{A}(_{\sim}\succ 0\pi)$.
Theorem 1 Suppose lhat MJ salisfies Axioms $\mathrm{N}$ and M. Then we have
$\mathrm{A}\mathrm{P}(_{\sim}^{\succ})\subset \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}\succ)$ for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}^{\succ}\sim\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$
Proof: $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{e}\iota_{\sim}\succ\star\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ be such lhat any player is indifferent between all social stales. Since MJ is non-
empty valued, we have for any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ ,
(1) $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ*, \mathrm{X}_{-\mathrm{i}})\sim$ for some $\mathrm{X}_{1}.\in \mathrm{X}$ ;
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Applying AxiomN to (1), we have
(2) $\mathrm{x}\in\Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ*, \mathrm{X}_{\sim i})\sim$ for any $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ ;
$\mathrm{T}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{k}e\succ\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ alld$\mathrm{y}\sim\in \mathrm{A}\mathrm{P}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$ arbitrary. $\mathrm{C}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}}\mathrm{g}^{\succ}\sim \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}_{\sim}\succ*$ , and applying Axiom $\mathrm{M}$ to (2), we
have
(3) $\mathrm{y}\in\Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\sim’\sim)$.
$\mathrm{T}]\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ together with $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{A}\mathrm{P}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$ implies $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}\succ)\mathrm{w}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}$ is the desired result.
Any deviation of a player from an approval equilibrium is not supporled by anyone as well as the
player himself. Is seems to be very natural lhal any approval equilibrium is a morally consistent
$\mathrm{e}$quilibrium since moral judgements we defined are done by considering lhe interest in all
individuals. However il is quile obvious lhat approval equilibria do not necessarily exist.
It is difficult to prove that any MCE is a Nash equilibrium, which is the most important result in
lhe $\mathrm{P}_{\sim}^{\mathrm{a}}$per. The proof proceeds with a mathematical induction on lhe number of players and aclions.
Lmmas 1 and 2 complete the proof of the case wilh lwo players and two aclions. $’\Pi\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ proof is
relatively simple, thus il is sufficienl for the readers who has few time to read $\mathrm{u}\iota\iota \mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}$ lwo lemmas.
Lemma 1 Assume that there are two players with lwo actions. Suppose that MJ satisfies Axiom $\mathrm{A}$,
$\mathrm{N}$ , and E. lhen we have
$[(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}},\mathrm{X}_{-i})\succ(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}^{\mathrm{X}_{-i}}},)\ (\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}},\mathrm{x}_{-1})\prec(\mathrm{j})(\mathrm{y}_{i},\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})arrow\{\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}},\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\}=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{-}j\sim’\cdot]$ for any $\mathrm{i},$ $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N},$ $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}},$ $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}$, and $\mathrm{x}_{\sim \mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{X}$ .
Proo$f$: Let $\mathrm{N}=\{1,2\}$ and $\mathrm{X}=\{\alpha, \beta\}$ . We will show
(1) $(\mathrm{a},\alpha)\succ(1)(\beta,\alpha)\ (\alpha,\mathrm{a})\prec(2)(\beta,\mathrm{a})arrow\{\alpha,\beta\}=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(1,\succ\alpha)\sim’$.
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By Axioms A and $\mathrm{N}$, this completes the proof of Lemma 2. Suppose tllat $\{\alpha\}=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(1, .\sim\succ, \mathrm{a})$ .
$\mathrm{L}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\succ\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}\sim^{1}$ be such thal
(2) $(\beta,\beta)\succ^{1}(1)(\mathrm{a},\beta)\ (\beta,\beta)\prec^{1}(2)(\alpha,\beta)$
$\mathrm{C}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}\sim \mathrm{a}\succ \mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\succ\sim 1$, and apply.ing Axiom $\mathrm{N}$ , we have
(3) $\{\beta\}=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(1,\succ 1\sim’\beta)$
$\mathrm{L}\mathrm{e}\iota_{\sim}\succ 2\in \mathrm{P}\mathrm{N}$be such that
(4) $(\beta,\mathrm{a})\succ^{2}(1)(\alpha,\alpha)\ (\beta,\mathrm{a})\prec^{2}(2)(\alpha,\alpha)$ .
$\mathrm{c}_{\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}_{\sim^{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}}\sim}}\succ\succ 2$ , and applying Axiom $\mathrm{N}$, we have
(5) $(\beta\}=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(1,\succ 2\alpha)\sim’$ .
$\mathrm{L}\epsilon \mathrm{t}^{\succ 3}\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}\sim$ be such lhat
(4) $(\alpha,\beta)\succ^{3}(1)(\beta,\beta)\ (\alpha,\beta)\prec^{3}(2)(\beta,\beta)$ .
$\mathrm{C}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}\sim^{1}\mathrm{a}\succ \mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\succ\sim^{3}$
’ and applying Axiom $\mathrm{N}$, we $1_{1}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{v}e$
(5) $\{\alpha\}=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(1,\succ 3\beta\sim’)$ .
Let a permulation $\pi$ on $\mathrm{N}$ be such that $\pi(1)=2$ and $\pi(2)=1$ . With this $\pi$, lel us $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}_{\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}1[e\mathrm{s}}\sim}\succ 2\pi$
$\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}_{\sim}\succ 3\pi$ corresponding $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}_{\sim^{2}}\succ \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}_{\sim^{3}}\succ$ respectively. By Axiom A we have
(6) $(\alpha, \beta)\succ^{2\pi}(2)(\alpha,\alpha)\ (\alpha, \beta)\prec^{2\pi}(1)(\mathrm{a},\mathrm{a})\ \{\beta\}=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(2,\succ 2\pi\sim’ \mathrm{a})$ .
(7) $(\beta, \alpha)\succ^{3\pi}(2)(\beta,\beta)\ (\beta, \mathrm{a})\prec^{3\pi}(1)(\beta,\beta)\ \{\mathrm{a}\}=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(2,\succ\sim^{3\pi}’\beta)$
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$\mathrm{L}\mathrm{e}\iota_{\sim}\succ*\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ be such lhat
$\sim\succ*(1):(\mathrm{a},\alpha),$ $(\beta,\beta),$ $(\beta,\alpha),$ $(\mathrm{a},\beta)$
$\sim\succ*(2):(\beta,\mathrm{a}),$ $(\mathrm{a},\beta),$ $(\alpha,\alpha),$ $(\beta,\beta)$ .
Applying Axiom $\mathrm{N}$ , we have $\{\beta\}=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(1,\succ*, \beta\sim)(\mathrm{b}\mathrm{y}$ the comparison $\mathrm{o}f_{\sim^{\iota_{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}}}\sim}^{\succ\succ*)_{\backslash }}\{\beta\}=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(2,\succ*\sim$’
$\alpha)$ $($ by lhe comparison $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}_{\sim^{2\pi}}\succ \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\succ*)_{\backslash }\sim$ $\langle$ $\alpha\}=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(2,\succ*\sim’\beta)$ $($by lhe comparison $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}_{\sim^{3\pi}}\succ$ and $\succ*)_{\backslash }$
$\mathrm{x}\sigma\langle\alpha$} $=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(1, \sim\succ*, \alpha)$ (by lhe comparison $\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}_{\sim^{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}}\sim}\succ\succ*$ ). However theses contradicl Axiom E. If
$(\beta\}=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(1,\succ\alpha)\sim"$ lhen lhe same procedure leads us to a contradiclion. Hence we must recognize $\{\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{s}}$
$\beta\}=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(1,\succ\sim’\alpha).\mathrm{T}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ completes the proof of (1). $\square$
Lemma 2 Assume lhat there are two players wilh two actions. Suppose lhat MJ satisfies Axiom $\mathrm{A}$,
$\mathrm{N},$ $\mathrm{M}$ , and E. Then we have
$\mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}\succ)\subset \mathrm{N}\mathrm{A}(\succ)\sim$ for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\succ\sim\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$
Proof$\cdot$. Let $\mathrm{N}=\{1,2\}$ and $\mathrm{X}=\{\alpha, \beta\}$ . Take $(\alpha,\alpha)\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}\succ)$. Suppose $(\alpha,\alpha)\prec(1)(\beta,\mathrm{a})$ . By Lemmal
and Axioms $\mathrm{N}$ and $\mathrm{M}$, we have $\beta\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(1,\succ\alpha)\sim’$ no matter what preference player 2 have. However
this contradicts $(\mathrm{a},\mathrm{a})\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}\succ)$ . lhus we have $(\alpha,\alpha)_{\sim}^{\succ}(1)(\beta,\alpha)$ . Similarly we have
$(\mathrm{a},\alpha)_{\sim}^{\succ}(2)(\alpha, \beta)$ . $’\Pi_{1}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}$ complele $(\alpha,\mathrm{a})\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{A}(_{\sim}\succ)$ which is the desired $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}.\square$
Lemma 3 Assume lhat there are two aclions. Suppose lhat MJ satisfies Axioms $\mathrm{A},$ $\mathrm{N},\mathrm{M}$ , and E.
Then we have
$\mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(\succ)\sim\subset \mathrm{N}\mathrm{A}(\succ)\sim$ for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\succ\sim\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$.
Proof: We use an induclion argument on lhe number of players. Lemma 2 shows that it is true for the
case of $\mathrm{n}=2$ . Assuming thal Lemma 3 is lrue for $\mathrm{n}-1$ , we consider the case of $\mathrm{n}.$ Lae$\mathrm{t}\mathrm{X}=\{\alpha_{\backslash }$
$\beta\}$ . Suppose lhat
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(1) $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$ .
Wilhoul loss of pnerality, lel $\mathrm{x}=(\beta,\beta,\ldots,\beta)$ . By lelling $\mathrm{y}=(\mathrm{a},\beta\ldots.,\beta)$, and by IlotiIlg Axioms A $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{N}$ ,
il is sufficient 10 show
(2) $\mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ(1)\mathrm{y}$.
Lel $\mathrm{X}^{*}=\{\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}:\mathrm{y}_{\mathfrak{n}}=\beta\}$ . Consider a game $\mathrm{G}^{\sim \mathrm{n}}=(\mathrm{N}-\{\mathrm{n}\},\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}- 1})$ . $\mathrm{F}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\succ\sim^{\mathrm{N}\sim 1}\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}\cdot 1}$ , we $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\succ\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}\sim^{\mathrm{N}}$ such
that
(3) $\mathrm{x}_{\sim^{\mathrm{N}- 1}}\succ(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{y}rightarrow(\mathrm{x},\mathrm{a})_{\sim}\succ \mathrm{N}(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{y},\alpha)$ for any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}-\{\mathrm{n}\}$ , $\mathrm{x},$ $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}-1}$ ;
(4) $(\mathrm{x}.\alpha)-^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{x},\beta)$ for any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N},$ $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ ; and
(5) $\sim^{\mathrm{N}}\succ(\mathrm{n})\cap \mathrm{X}^{*}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{X}^{*\succ}=(\sim \mathrm{n})\cap \mathrm{X}^{*}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{X}^{*}$ .
$\sim^{\mathrm{N}}\succ$ is uniquely determined. A moral judgement rule $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{\mathrm{N}- 1}$ of game $\mathrm{G}^{- \mathrm{n}}$ is given by
(6) For any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}-\{\mathrm{n}\},\succ\sim^{\mathrm{N}\cdot 1}\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}- 1}$ , and $\mathrm{x}_{-\{\dot{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{n}\}}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}-2}$,
$\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{\mathrm{N}- 1}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{X}_{\sim\{\dot{\iota}\mathrm{n}\}})\sim^{\mathrm{N}- 1}’:=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{\sim i})\sim^{\mathrm{N}}"$where $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.=(\mathrm{x}_{\{\dot{\iota}\mathrm{n}\}}., \beta)$.
It is obvious thal $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{\mathrm{N}\sim 1}$ satisfies Axioms $\mathrm{A},$ $\mathrm{N}$ , and M.
Lel us show that $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{\mathrm{N}- 1}$ satisfies Axiom E. $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{e}\succ\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}\cdot 1}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{e}\sim^{\mathrm{N}- 1}$ arbitrary. Since MJ salisfies Axiom $\mathrm{E}$,
there is some $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ such lhat $\mathrm{y}\in\Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}, \sim^{\mathrm{N}}\succ, \mathrm{y}_{\sim \mathrm{i}})$. Lelting $\mathrm{z}=(\mathrm{y}_{-\mathrm{n}},\beta),$ (4) and Axiom $\mathrm{N}$ imply
$\mathrm{z}\in\Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}, \sim\succ \mathrm{N}, \mathrm{y}_{-\mathrm{i}})$ . $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ wilh (6) $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}^{\mathrm{t}}1\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{z}_{-\mathrm{n}}\in\Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}-\{\mathfrak{n}\}}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{\mathrm{N}\sim 1}(\mathrm{i}, \sim\succ \mathrm{N}\sim 1, \mathrm{y}_{-(\mathrm{i}.\mathrm{n}\}})$ , which is the desired
result. $\mathrm{L}\mathrm{e}\iota\succ\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}- 1}\sim^{\mathrm{N}\cdot 1}$ be such that
(7) For any $\mathrm{i},$ $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}-\{\mathrm{n}\}$ , and $\mathrm{z},$ $\mathrm{w}\in \mathrm{X}(\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})$ , where $\mathrm{x}=(\beta,\beta,..,\beta)$,
$\mathrm{z}_{\mathrm{n}\sim}.\succ \mathrm{N}-1(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{w}_{-\mathrm{R}}\alphaarrow \mathrm{z}_{\sim}^{\succ}(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{w}$.
By definition, $\sim^{\mathrm{N}}\succ\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ is given by
(8) $\sim^{\mathrm{N}}\succ(\mathrm{i})\cap \mathrm{X}(\mathrm{X}_{-\mathrm{j}})\mathrm{x}\mathrm{X}(\mathrm{X}_{\sim \mathrm{j}})=\succ(\sim \mathrm{i})\cap \mathrm{X}(\mathrm{X}_{\sim \mathrm{j}})\mathrm{x}\mathrm{X}(\mathrm{X}_{-\mathrm{j}})\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N},$ $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}-\{\mathrm{n}\},$ $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}=(\beta,\beta,\ldots,\beta)$ .
By Axiom $\mathrm{N},$ (1), and (8), we have $\mathrm{x}\in\Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{N}\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim’.\cdot$ ihus by (6),
(9) $\mathrm{x}\in\Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}-\{\mathfrak{n}\int}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{\mathrm{N}\sim 1}(- \mathbb{R}\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{N}\cdot 1\mathrm{x}_{(\dot{\iota}\mathrm{n}\}})\sim’.\cdot$
Now we show
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(10) For any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}-\{\mathrm{n}\},$ $(\mathrm{a}, \mathrm{x}_{1\dot{\iota}\mathrm{n}\}}.)\succ^{\mathrm{N}- 1}(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{n}}$ , we have $\mathrm{a}\not\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(1,\succ \mathrm{x}_{\{1.\mathrm{n}\}})\sim^{\mathrm{N}\cdot 1}’.$ , $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{l}\iota \mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}$ $\mathrm{a}$ is i-
componenl
We have $(\alpha, \mathrm{x}_{\{\dot{\iota}\mathrm{n}\}}.,\beta)\succ^{\mathrm{N}}(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{n}}.,\beta)$. By (1) and (8), we have $\alpha\not\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}_{\sim^{\mathrm{N}}},\succ,\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})$. $\mathrm{n}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ with (6) means
(10).
(9) and (10) mean $\mathrm{X}_{-\mathrm{n}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}\succ \mathrm{N}\cdot 1)$ . By lhe hypothesis of lhe mathematical $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\iota \mathrm{l},$ $\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{n}}$ is a Nash
equilibrium of game $\mathrm{G}^{-\mathrm{n}}$ . Thus we have
(11) $\mathrm{x}_{\sim \mathrm{f}\mathrm{l}}\succ \mathrm{N}\cdot 1(\sim 1)(\alpha, \mathrm{x}_{\sim(1_{i}\iota\}})$ .
By (3) and (11), we have $(\mathrm{x}_{-\mathfrak{n}},\alpha)_{\sim}\succ \mathrm{N}(1)(\alpha, \mathrm{x}_{\{1.\mathrm{n}\}}.,\alpha)$ . $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ with (4) means $(\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{n}},\beta)_{\approx}\succ \mathrm{N}(1)(\alpha, \mathrm{X}_{\sim\{1,\mathrm{n}\}},\beta)$,
i.e., $\mathrm{x}_{\sim^{\mathrm{N}}}\succ(1)\mathrm{y}$. Moreover (8) means $\mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ(1)\mathrm{y}$, which is the desired $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}.\square$
Lemma 4 Suppose thal MJ satisfies Axioms $\mathrm{N}$ and M. Dhen we have the following.
$\mathrm{L}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\succ\sim\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ , $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$, $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}},$ $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{X}$, and $\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}- 1}$ be given.
If $(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{x}_{-i})\succ(\mathrm{j})(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}},\mathrm{x}_{-i})$ for any $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$, and (ii) $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{-:})\sim"$ then we have $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim’.$ .
Proof: $\mathrm{I}x\iota_{\sim}\succ\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ be such that
(1) $(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.)\succ(\mathrm{j})(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}},\mathrm{x}_{\sim \mathrm{i}})$ for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$ and;
(2) $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim’.$ .
Lel $\sim\succ*\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ be such lhat
(3) $(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})\sim(*\mathrm{j})$ ($\mathrm{y}\mathrm{t}.,$ x)-i for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$ ; and
(4) $(\mathrm{z}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})_{\sim}^{\succ}*\mathfrak{h})(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})rightarrow(\mathrm{z}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})_{\sim}^{\succ}(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{X}_{\sim i})$ for any $\mathrm{z}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{X}-\{\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$ .
It follows from (1), (2), (3), (4), and Axiom $\mathrm{M}$ thal
(5) $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ*,\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim.$.
Let permutations $\mathrm{p}_{1},\ldots,\mathrm{p}_{n}$ on X be such that
(6) $\mathrm{p}_{1},\ldots,\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{i}\cdot 1},\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{i}+\iota},\ldots,\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{n}}$ are idenlities, and $\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})=\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}\backslash }\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}})=\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}},$ $\mathrm{p}(r_{\lrcorner \mathrm{i}})=\mathrm{z}_{\mathrm{i}}$ for any $\mathrm{z}_{1}.\neq \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}},$ $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}$.
$\mathrm{k}\iota_{\sim}\succ’\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ be such that
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(7) For any $\mathrm{x},$ $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N},$ $\mathrm{x}\succ*(\sim \mathrm{j})\mathrm{y}\cdot\sim \mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ’(i)\rho o\mathrm{y}$.
By (5), (7), and Axiom $\mathrm{N}$, we have
(8) $\mathrm{x}_{i}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ’,\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim.$.
Since (3) $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\succ\sim’\sim=\succ\star$, we have
(9) $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ*,\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim.$.
$\mathrm{C}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}^{\succ}\sim \mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\succ\sim*$, applying (9) to Axiom $\mathrm{N}$, we have $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\sim’.$. $\square$
Theorem 2 Suppose thal MJ satisfies Axioms $\mathrm{A},$ $\mathrm{N},$ $\mathrm{M}$, and E. Then we have
$\mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(\succ)\sim\subset \mathrm{N}\mathrm{A}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$ for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}_{\sim}\in\succ \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$
Proof$\cdot$. We use an indtlction argument on the $\mathrm{n}\iota\iota \mathrm{m}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ of aclions. Lemma 3 shows that this is true for
the case with two aclions. $\mathrm{A}ss$uming thal Theorem 2 is true for lhe case wilh 11-1 aclions, we
consider the case wilh $\mathrm{n}$ aclions. Suppose
(1) $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$ .
Take $\mathrm{a}\in \mathrm{X}$ arbilrary, and fix it hereaRer. kt permutations $\mathrm{p}_{1},\ldots,\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{n}}$ on X be given by
$\mathrm{p}_{\dot{1}}(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})\neq\alpha$ if $\mathrm{x}_{i}=\alpha_{\backslash }\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{i}}(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}})=\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}$ otherwise, for any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}_{\mathrm{s}}$ where $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}$ is $\mathrm{i}$-componenl of $\mathrm{x}$ in (1).
$\mathrm{I}x\iota_{\sim}\succ r\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ be given by
(2) $\mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{y}rightarrow \mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x}_{\sim}\succ’(\mathrm{i})\mathrm{p}o\mathrm{y}$for any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ , and $\mathrm{x},$ $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ .
Applying Axiom $\mathrm{N}$ to (1), we have
(3) $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}^{\succ \mathrm{P}})$ .
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Now partilion $\mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ illlo $\mathrm{n}+\mathrm{l}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}s\mathrm{u}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{Y}^{\mathrm{O}},$ $\mathrm{Y}^{1},\ldots,\mathrm{Y}^{\mathfrak{n}}$ as follows. : $\mathrm{Y}^{\mathrm{k}}(0\leq \mathrm{k}\leq \mathrm{n})$ is lhe set of all
aclions profiles $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ for which $\mathrm{k}$ components satisfy $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}=\alpha$ . A subset $\mathrm{p}*$ of preferences profiles is
defined by
(4) $\sim\succ*\in \mathrm{P}^{*}[](\mathrm{i})\mathrm{x}\succ(*\mathrm{j})\mathrm{y}$ for any $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{Y}^{\mathrm{k}- 1},$ $\mathrm{y}\in \mathrm{Y}^{\mathrm{k}}(0\leq \mathrm{k}\leq \mathrm{m})$, and. $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N};(\mathrm{i}\mathrm{i})\mathrm{x}\sim(*|\rangle \mathrm{x}’$ for any $\mathrm{x}$,
$\mathrm{x}’\in \mathrm{Y}^{\mathrm{k}}(1\leq \mathrm{k}\leq \mathrm{m}),$ $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$ .
Consider a game $\mathrm{G}^{0}=(\mathrm{N},(\mathrm{Y}^{0})^{\mathrm{N}})$ . We denole generic preferences profile in lhe game $\mathrm{b}\mathrm{y}_{\sim}^{\succ 0}$ , and the
set of the profiles $\mathrm{P}^{0}$ respectively. For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\sim^{0}\in\succ \mathrm{P}^{0}$, we $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}_{1}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\succ\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}\sim^{0*}$by
(5) $\sim\succ 0*\in \mathrm{P}^{*}$; and
(6) $\sim^{0*}\succ(\mathrm{i})\cap \mathrm{Y}^{0}\cap \mathrm{Y}^{\mathrm{o}}=\succ(\sim^{0}\mathrm{i})$ for any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ .
By (5) and (6) $,$ $\sim^{0*}\succ$ is uniquely determined. A moral judgement rule $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{0}$ of the game is defined by
(7) For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\sim^{0}\in\succ \mathrm{P}^{0},$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N},$ $\mathrm{X}_{-\mathrm{i}}\in(\mathrm{Y}^{0})^{\mathrm{N}- 1}$, $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{0}(\mathrm{i}, \sim^{0}\succ, \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}}):=\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{x}_{\sim \mathrm{i}})\sim^{0*}’-\{\alpha\}$.
By (5) and Lemma 4, $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{0}$ is well defined. It is obvious that $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{0}$ satisfies Axioms $\mathrm{A},$ $\mathrm{N}$, and M. Let
us show lhat $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{0}$ salisfies Axiom E. Take $\sim^{0}\succ\in \mathrm{P}^{0}$ arbitrary. Corresponding 10 the $\sim^{0}\succ$, lhere is a
$\mathrm{u}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{e}\succ*\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}\sim^{0}$ , and moreover there is some $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}}$ with $\mathrm{x}\in\Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}, \sim^{0*}\succ,\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})$ since MJ satisfies
Axiom E. If $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{Y}^{\mathrm{k}}(\mathrm{k}\neq 0)$, then (5) and Lemma 4 imply that there is some $\mathrm{y}^{\mathrm{k}- 1}\in \mathrm{Y}^{\mathrm{k}\sim 1}$ with $\ell-$
$1\in\Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{y}_{-\mathrm{i}}\sim^{0*}’)$ . Repeating the same procedure by $\mathrm{k}$ times, we can find some $\mathrm{z}\in \mathrm{Y}^{0}$ with $\mathrm{z}\in\Pi$
$\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i},\succ \mathrm{z}_{-\mathrm{i}})\sim^{0*}’$ . $\mathrm{T}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ shows thal $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{0}$ satisfies Axiom E.
Corresponding $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}^{\succ \mathrm{r}}\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}\sim$ of (2), $1\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}^{\succ 0}\in \mathrm{P}^{*}\sim$ be such thal
(8) $\sim^{\rho}\succ(\mathrm{i})\cap \mathrm{Y}^{0}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{Y}^{0}=\succ(\sim^{0}\mathrm{i})\cap \mathrm{Y}^{0}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{Y}^{0}$.
By (3), (7), and Axiom $\mathrm{M}$ , we have
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(9) $\mathrm{p}o\mathrm{x}\in\Pi_{\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{0}(\mathrm{i},\succ(\sim^{0}’ \mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x})_{-i})$ .
On lhe olher hand, (3), (7), and (8) implies
(10) $((\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x})_{\mathrm{i}}, (\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x})_{\mathrm{i}}.)_{\sim^{0}}^{\succ}(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}, (\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x})_{\mathfrak{i}}.)$ for any $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}^{0}(\mathrm{i},\succ(\sim^{0}’ \mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x})_{-\mathrm{i}})$ and $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ .
By (9) and (10), we have
(11) $\mathrm{p}o\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim^{0}}^{\succ})$ .
Therefore pox is a MCE of game $\mathrm{G}^{0}$. By lhe hypothesis oflhe induction, we $1\iota \mathrm{a}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$
(12) $((\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x})_{\iota}., (\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x})_{-i})_{\sim^{0}}^{\succ}(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}, (\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x})_{-\mathrm{i}})$ for any $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{X}-\{\alpha\}$ and $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ .
This with (8) implies
(13) $((\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x})_{\mathrm{i}}, (\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x})_{-\mathrm{i}})_{\sim}^{\succ\theta}(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}, (\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{x})_{\mathrm{t}}\sim\cdot)$ for any $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{X}-\{\alpha\}$ and $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ .
By (2), we have
(14) $(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})_{\sim}^{\succ}(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{p}_{\mathrm{i}}^{1}(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}), \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}}))$ for any $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{X}-\{\alpha\}$ and $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ .
Thus $(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{x}_{-i})_{\sim}^{\succ}(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{X}_{-\mathrm{i}})$ for any $\mathrm{y}_{i}\in \mathrm{X}-\{\alpha\}$ is lrue for any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ . Taking $\beta\in \mathrm{X}$ which is differenl
from $\mathrm{a}$ , lhe same argument leads is to $(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}, \mathrm{X}_{-\mathrm{i}})_{\sim}^{\succ}(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{y}_{;}, \mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.)$ for any $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{X}-\{\beta\}\alpha\}$ is lrue for any $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ .
Thus we have $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{A}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$ , which is lhe desired result. $\square$
Theorem 2 does not hold if al least one of the four axioms is not satisfied. $\mathrm{T}l\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ fact is easily
identified by the examples 1104. In lhe case of example 4, consider the preferences $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}1\mathrm{e}^{\succ}\sim$ in
lhe following: The preference of each player is a linear ordering; Players 2, . . $.,\mathrm{n}$ have lhe
completely opposile orderings to thal of player 1. (Hence players 2, . . $.,\mathrm{n}$ have the same linear
188
orderings.)
Nole lhal the reverse of Reorem 2 does not neoessarily hold as example 6 shows. Comparing
example 5 wilh example 6, lhe sel of morally consislenl equilibria changes according 10 $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ . Il is
equal to lhe set of Nash equilibria in example 5, and is less than that in example 6. Whal we $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{l}\iota \mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}$
in the paper is lhat it includes the set of all approval $\mathrm{e}$quilibria and is included in that of Nash
equilibria. There remains to be an open question about complete characterizalion of the set of
equilibria with respecl to each and every $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ . When we strengthen the neulrality axiom to the strict
one, we have the following characterization.
Theooem 3 Suppose that MJ satisfies Axioms SN and M. hhen we have
$\mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}\succ)=\mathrm{N}\mathrm{A}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$ for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\sim\in\succ \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ .
Proof: By repeating lhe same procedure as in Theorem 1 , we $\mathrm{h}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\supset$. Lel us $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\subset$. Suppose on
the contrary that $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}^{\succ})\ \mathrm{x}\not\in \mathrm{N}\mathrm{A}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$, then we have
(1) there is some $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$ and $\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\not\in \mathrm{X}$ such $\mathrm{t}1_{1}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}},\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})\prec(\mathrm{i})(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}},\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})\ \mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}}\not\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}},\succ)\sim$ .
By&mma 4, $1\mathrm{e}\iota_{\sim}\succ*\in \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}}$ be such that
(2) $(\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}},\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})\prec(\mathrm{j})(\mathrm{y}_{\mathrm{i}},\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})$ for any $\mathrm{j}\in \mathrm{N}$ ; and
(3) $\sim(\mathrm{i})=\succ(\sim \mathrm{i})$ .
By (3), $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}^{\succ})$ , and Axiom $\mathrm{S}\mathrm{N}$ , we have $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}^{\succ*})$, i.e., $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i},\sim}\succ*).\mathrm{A}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{i}_{1\mathrm{l}}\mathrm{g}$ Lemma 4
to this and (2) , we have $\mathrm{y}_{i}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}, \mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}},\succ*)\sim$. However this conlradicls $\mathrm{x}\in \mathrm{M}\mathrm{C}(_{\sim}^{\succ*}),$ (1), and (3). $\mathrm{T}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$
completes the proof. $\square$
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Theorem 3 does $\mathrm{n}o\mathrm{t}$ hold if either Axiom SN or $\mathrm{M}$ is lacked. Example 2 illustrates lhat Axiom SN
is necessary for Theorem 3. She example below shows that Axiom $\mathrm{M}$ is also necessary.
Example 7
For $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{y}\sim\in\succ \mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{N}},$ $\mathrm{i}\in \mathrm{N}$, and $\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.\in \mathrm{X}^{\mathrm{N}- 1},$ $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}(\mathrm{i}_{\sim},\succ,\mathrm{x}_{1}.):=$ { $\alpha\in \mathrm{X}:(\mathrm{a},\mathrm{x}_{\mathrm{i}}.)_{\sim}^{\prec}(\mathrm{i})(\beta,\mathrm{x}_{-\mathrm{i}})$ for any $\beta\in \mathrm{X}$}.
Theorem 2 is inlerpreted in the following three aspects. First, $7\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}2$ demonstrales that lhe
morally consislenl aclion is a best respon.$\mathrm{s}\mathrm{s}e$ strategy in lhe limited set of possible $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{l}\iota \mathrm{s}$ so long as
the olher players select in lhe same way. In this sense the morally consistenl $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{I}\iota \mathrm{s}$ are regarded 10
be incentive compalible. $\mathrm{T}l\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ is the mosl important interpretation of our lheorem since most
economists and game lheorists seem commonly 10 hold lhe intuilive idea thal tlle devialion from lhe
morally preferable actions is a best response strategy. This intuition does not hold whenever
the above four axioms are imposed on $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$. Thus lhe result is drastic so as to revolutionize our
ideas and provides a new viewpoint.
Second, morals, especially welfarislic morals, are not necessarily effective as a norm 10 illduce
socially desirable actions. At least lhe following three $\mathrm{r}e$asons should be discussed. Al leasl lhree
reasons should be discussed.
(1) MJ in Theorem 2 is esselltially lhe same as that in example $5^{4}$ . Il is amoral since any individual
can do any action as righl in any circumslance. As long as MJ satisfies lhe four axioms in Theorem 2,
it is nonsense as a system of morals. As long as MJ satisfies the four axioms in Theorem 2, it is
nonsense as a system of morals. lhe justification of lhis critics depends on that of lhe axioms, $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}$
must be sufficiently remarked. In particular, Axiom $\mathrm{N}$ (neutrality) is confronted wilh a lot of
crilicism. What result raises by $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\dot{\mathrm{x}}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ Axiom $\mathrm{N}$ to Axiom I (independence) is an open questioll.
4 For lhe sakc of avoiding misllnderstandings, MJ satisfying the $fo\iota 1\mathrm{r}$ axioms is said not to be nccessarily
equivalenl to MJ in cxample 5. We only say lhal the set of MCEs dcrived from MJ salisfyiug lhe axioms
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It is clear from the $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}_{\mathrm{I}}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}o\mathrm{n}$ of MCE lhat the information used in MJ is not the cardinal but lhe
ordinal preferences of individuals. There might be no doubl about lhe possibilily thal the deficiency
of informational basis makes it ineffective (as is well known in the discussion of independence
axioms in lhe lheory of $\mathrm{s}$ocial choice). The properties of MCE under lhe assumption of cardinal
preferences as an informalional basis musl be scrutinized in the future. $\mathrm{T}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{s}$ line of research is also
critical to the study ofjustification of modern utilitarianism a la Harsanyi (1955) and Hare (1981).
(2) theorem 2 also gives a necessary condition for exislence of MCE. Given a preferences profile,
MCE exists if and only if (pure) Nash equilibrium exists. Since the set of (pure) Nash equilibria
may be empty when the set of stralegies is finile, some limitation might be imposed on $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ .
Nonexistence of MCE will $o\mathrm{c}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{u},\mathrm{r}$ when MJ gives amoral judgemenl so that each $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}^{\mathrm{t}}\mathrm{s}$ naive
rationality is accepted.
One of the escaping routes to overcome this impossibility is to restrict the domain of $\mathrm{M}\mathrm{J}$ , i.e., lhe
set of admissible preferences profiles. More concretely, we may conslruct the domain by gathering
profiles under which Nash equilibrium exisls. This idea is based on the idea lhat not moral
judgement but ralional decision-making of each player is 10 blame in the situation where Nash
equilibrium does Ilot exisl. Since the assumption of unrestricted domain has been used lhoroughly
in Theorem 2, lhis direction of research is of greal worth.
(3) $7\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}2$ also shows lhat il is possible for MJ 10 resolve the prisoners dilemma in which
Nash equilibrium is not Pareto oplimal. We will refer 10 repeated games for lhe resolution. It is well
known lhat the dilemma is resolved in the repeated games if lhe players take strategies such as
trigger or lit for tal againsl others\dagger betrayal in lhe long run. $7\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}.\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}$ strategies may be interpreted as lhe
process in which tacit morals emerge sponlaneously 10 self-constrain lhe $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{t}\iota \mathrm{s}^{5}$. One suggested
is equal to that ffom MJ in example 5.
5 According to lhe Folk Theorem (see, for example, Fudenkrg and Maskin (1986)), any individually
rational payoff vector appears in eqtlilibrium. This shows lhat any actiou deviating voluntarily from lhe
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direction of research is thal the spontaneous morals should be examined by our normalive approach‘.
Second, hheorem 2 accomplishes a normalive juslification of Nash equilibrium. Furthermore
Theorem 3 $\dot{g}\mathrm{v}e\mathrm{s}$ an axiomalization of Nash equilibrium7. $7\mathrm{b}\mathrm{e}$ nolion of Nash equilibrium has beetl
sustained from prescriptive point of view, which explains the juslification of Nash equilibrium by the
rationalily aspecl in deciding the aclions8. On the other hand, as the result shows, Nash $\mathrm{e}$quilibrium
is also justified from the normalive and $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$ point of view with respecl lo moral judgement on
actions.
initial payoff veclor never occur, $\mathrm{i}$ . $\mathrm{e}.$ , such morals corresponding to the payoffs emerge spontaneously.
6 We have a conjecture lhat this problem can not be resolved. The basic idea undcrlying the axioms
except for effectiveness sheds $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\iota$ on some symmetry between the two siluations, and requires the
cotlsistent applicatiou of MJ in the symmetric situalions. Even thoug any symmelry does not hold in
each slage of the whole game, some $\mathrm{s}$ymmetry can $\mathrm{k}$ fouud in the sequcnce of (infinilc or fiuilcly many)
games.
7 Other axiomalization of Nash equilibrium appeared in the literalure. See, for example, Peleg, Polters,
and Tijs$(1996)$, Patrone, Pieri, Tijs and Torre (1998).
8 The $\mathrm{j}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}$ of Nash equilibrium can mainly $\mathrm{k}$ divided into five groups. Thc first is a
justification by a pre-play communication; If the players have chances to communicate their slralegies
with each other and gel into an agreement to lhe ffiture slralegies bcfore the aclual game starts, then lhe n-
luple of stralegies must be a Nash equilibrium. Sec, for example, Binmore (1990), $\mathrm{A}\iota \mathrm{l}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{n}$ and
$\mathrm{B}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{b}\backslash \mathrm{l}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}$ (1996) for more detailed discussion about the notion of Nash equilibrium from the
prescriptive point of view. The second is a $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{f}- \mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\iota \mathrm{l}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ prophecy. If all lhe players sharc the lhcory
to prospect olhers’ aclions, the resulling action from the lheory must be a Nash $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\iota \mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}n\mathrm{m}$ (see
Myerson$(1991))$. The third depends on a focal point. When lhc players know how to play lhe gamc
from the idea of lhe slruclure of lhe game, lhey come 10 know how the others play. Such a slandard,
called a focal poinl, gives rise 10 a parlicular combinalion of strategies in equilibrium (see Schelling
(1960)$)$. The fourth is given by leaming. The players oflen learn $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{l}$ eqtlilibrium in lhe repeated
siluation. When lhe players leam others’ stralegy choices and maximize their payoffs, they are on the
equilibrium (see for example Kalai and Lehrer(1993) and so forlh). The fiflh is a juslification by
evolulionary games. Scc, for lhe earlier example, Taylor and Jonker (1978). Irrespeclive of lhe
voluntary action of payoff maximizalion, the stralegies giving lower payoffs may be weeded oul afler a
long period of lime, whereas lhose giving higher payoffs may survive. The outcome of their adjnslment
behavior $\mathrm{m}\iota \mathrm{l}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}$ coincide with Nash cquilibrium derived by their tenlalive maximiziug behavior.
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5 $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{o}\mathfrak{n}\mathrm{C}\mathrm{I}\mathrm{u}S\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$
It is reasonable that the morals discussed in lhi$\mathrm{s}$ paper should be interpreted as an exlernal and
implicil conslraint which governs individual action by its normalive appeal lo lhe members. Nole
that our morals are different from lhe judgements people hold in order 10 observe lhe principle of
juslice since all lhe axioms are imposed not on the standard for judgement of the social oulcomes but
on the individual aclions. Also note that lhey could not be interpreted as an implicit or explicit
contracl. This is because lhe contracts generally differ from person to person according 10 the
personality, capability, information at hand, and so forth, whereas lhe requiremenls of morals must
be consistent wilh each other by their own nalure9.
What is the most questionable here is the relationship between our morals and the libertarian
rights. Intuitively speaking, rigts in general have their bases on lhe law, and correspond to duties
in the most cases. The rights are caught in the perspeclive of general contract between lhe state and
lhe people as well as among lhem. It is obviously understood lhis perspective goes beyond our
framework. Contrarily limiting the discussion to the narrower description, the morals characterized
by the four axioms might be interpreted as lhe normative requireme.nts by the society to the
individual actions wilh respect to $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{I}$ the libertarian rights. In lhis view, how to judge
among libertarian rights should be determined by the $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{g},\mathrm{g}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ information on lhe preferences of
the parties. The similar approach to libertarian rights is well known in the theory of social choice,
and is quite different from ours in lhe motivation as well as in the. formulation of $\mathrm{m}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{s}^{1}$ .
9 It is not only fundamental $\mathrm{b}\iota \mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}$ also the merits of contracls lhal the contenls of contracls differ from
person to person. Il is said to be lhe most beneficia] point 10 lhe conlracls lhat lhcir contcnts arc
delermined depending on $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{d}\iota \mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$ malters of affairs in comparison with, for example, lhe markel lrades.
$1$ Thcre are two differenl approaches to lhe theory ofliberlarian rigts in the lheory of social choice; The
first is the classical Sen’s lheory of rigts, and lhe second the game-form approach to righls by Gaertner,
Paltanaik, and Suzumura(1992) which intends 10 overcome thc deficits in Scn’s origiual dcfillition.
Since the $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\downarrow$ in Sen’s sense is thal of rejecting undesirable outcome for the holder 10 be atlaincd, it can
not $\mathrm{k}$ derived from our definition of morally $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{g}\iota \mathrm{s}$ aclion $\mathrm{s}$.
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The lraditional elhics discusses in general the normalive justification of individual aclions. Evell
though each individual action is morally righl, the $\mathrm{c}o$nsequence of the actions in the society may not
accepted because of uncerlainly in lheir inlerdependence al leasl from the vicw of economics. be
reason is probably that, conlrary to general equilibrium lheory and game theory in economics, elhics
has no systematic model of interactions $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{m}o$ng illdividuals and of lhe consequence of lheir
interdependence. Il will be of great pleasure that our analysis would serve to give some light on such
trials.
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